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Abstract 
Empathy is a broad concept that involves the various ways in which we come to know and 
make connections with one another. As medical practice becomes progressively orientated 
towards a model of engaged partnership, empathy is increasingly important in healthcare. 
This is often conceived more specifically through the concept of therapeutic empathy, which 
has two aspects: interpersonal understanding and caring action. The question of how we make 
connections with one another was also central to the work of the novelist E.M. Forster. In this 
article we analyse Forster’s interpretation of connection – particularly in the novel Howards 
End – in order to explore and advance current debates on therapeutic empathy. We argue that 
Forster conceived of connection as a socially embedded act, reminding us that we need to 
consider how social structures, cultural norms, and institutional constraints serve to affect 
interpersonal connections. From this, we develop a dispositional account of therapeutic 
empathy in which connection is conceived as neither an instinctive occurrence nor a process 
of representational inference, but a dynamic process of embodied, embedded and actively 
engaged inquiry. Our account also suggests that therapeutic empathy is not merely an 
untrainable reflex but something that can be cultivated. We thus promote two key ideas. First, 
that empathy should be considered as much a social as an individual phenomenon. And 
second, that empathy training can and should be given to clinicians. 
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1. Introduction 
In his novel Howards End, E.M. Forster explored how three families – the Wilcoxes, 
Schlegels and Basts – developed relationships in early 20th century England. The thesis of 
this exploration is made manifest in the novel’s famous epigraph: “Only connect…”.1 Such a 
simple imperative drove much of Forster’s work and although its exact meaning is debated it 
has both individual and social aspects.2 That the epigraph ends with an ellipsis and is derived 
from a fictional world further implies ambiguity, creativity and possibility in how we make 
connections with one another. Forster’s focus on connection has influenced many other 
writers and artists, perhaps most explicitly Zadie Smith in her 2005 novel On Beauty.3  
Beyond such artistic horizons, with the medical treatment model of detached concern being 
replaced with one of engaged partnership, how we make connections with one another has 
become an important question in healthcare. This is increasingly considered through the 
concept of therapeutic empathy. 
Drawing on literary criticism, philosophy and cognitive science, in this article we first 
provide an outline of current debates on therapeutic empathy, before using an exegesis of 
Forster’s focus on connection – particularly in Howards End – to frame an exploration of 
how these debates might be overcome. In brief, we propose that Forster’s emphasis on the 
socio-cultural contingency of connection can be usefully developed into a dispositional 
account of therapeutic empathy. The consequences of such an account loop back to inform 
current conceptual debates on what empathy is and how it might be achieved. 
2. Therapeutic empathy 
Empathy is a broad concept with a complex history. The word from which it was 
translated – Einfühlung (‘feeling into’) – was coined as a technical aesthetic term by Robert 
Vischer in the late 19th century.4 The notion of experiencing an aesthetic object through 
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projecting one’s inner subjectivity was extended, by Theodor Lipps, to encompass how we 
might similarly come to know another’s mental state.5 Empathy has since been variously 
conceptualised in many fields, including philosophy, psychology, literature, medicine, and 
cognitive science.6 From a medical perspective, clinicians and researchers are generally 
interested in empathy for two reasons. First, the epistemological notion that empathy is a 
foundational concept in interpersonal understanding.7 And second, the ethical notion that 
being empathic can engender sensitivity and caring action towards patients.8 
2.1. Interpersonal understanding 
 With respect to empathy as a foundational concept in interpersonal understanding, 
research has largely focussed on the debate in philosophy of mind between theory-theory and 
simulation-theory. Broadly speaking, theory-theorists suggest we use a basic domain-specific 
framework of conceptual knowledge to infer the mental states of others.9 Simulation theorists 
deny that our understanding of others is quite so theoretical, instead suggesting that we use a 
model of our own mind to model the mind of others.10 In response to the dominant theory and 
simulation theories, some philosophers have proposed a different conception of empathy 
grounded in the phenomenological tradition.11 In this phenomenological proposal empathy is 
“a kind of act of perceiving… sui generis”.12 In arguing that theory and simulation theories 
focus too narrowly on explaining and predicting the actions of others, emphasis moves to the 
first-person character of consciousness, in which empathy refers to “our general ability to 
access the life of the mind of others in their expressions, expressive behaviour and 
meaningful actions”.13 
Contemporary research, therefore, provides three broad options for conceiving of 
interpersonal understanding: inferring (theory-theory); simulating (simulation-theory); and 
directly experiencing (phenomenological proposal).14 Given the related longstanding disputes 
in philosophy of mind it is not surprising to note that these three approaches have not been 
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reconciled. But as we hope to highlight in this article, how one conceives of interpersonal 
understanding has significant practical consequences. 
2.2. Caring action 
  The ethical notion that being empathic can engender sensitivity and caring action 
towards patients is, unlike interpersonal understanding, not always accepted as a necessary 
feature of empathy in general. This is because understanding someone does not lead 
inexorably to caring action.15 However, in the clinical context caring action is often included 
in an account of empathy because a clinician’s role is, by definition, oriented towards caring 
for patients.16 The explicit inclusion of caring action alongside interpersonal understanding 
has thus been used to distinguish therapeutic empathy from empathy in general.17 
2.3. Achieving therapeutic empathy in the clinic 
 Conceptual debates regarding therapeutic empathy notwithstanding, there is 
increasing evidence that empathic clinicians make better clinical judgements and improve 
treatment outcomes.18 Effective diagnosis and treatment requires reasoning processes that are 
engaged with, not detached from, a patient’s everyday experiences and concerns.19 Modern 
clinicians now largely understand the limitations of detached concern and the benefits of 
actively engaging with their patients’ ideas, concerns and expectations; movements such as 
person-centred care20, values-based practice21 and narrative medicine22 have contributed to 
this transition. However, for overworked and pressurised clinicians with restricted 
consultation times, building genuine connections with patients can, in practice, be difficult.23 
Recent research in UK primary care, for example, suggests that clinician workload is 
increasing in terms of both consultation rate and duration.24 This potentially restricts 
clinicians to conducting mechanistic diagnostic processes, which limits opportunities for 
building interpersonal relationships. 
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Forster captured the synthesis of rationality and value that characterises much modern 
medical practice in another famous lyrical phrase from Howards End: “the building of the 
rainbow bridge that should connect the prose in us with the passion”.25 His plan for such 
construction, as we have noted, was at first glance a simple one – “Only connect!”26 – in 
which the act of connection itself is foregrounded. However, Forster also recognised how 
difficult making connections can be given the manifest barriers to interpersonal 
understanding. Our exegesis of Forster is focused on exploring the effects of these barriers 
through two broad categories: connecting across public and private spheres; and connecting 
across socio-cultural and socio-economic divides. 
3. Connecting across public and private spheres 
Forster is seen by many critics as a pivotal novelist. For one so grounded in the 
sensibilities of English comic fiction, by his last novel – A Passage to India – he had 
transitioned to the foothills of modernism.27 The many competing readings of Forster – from 
crypto-colonialist to liberal innovator – suggest he was writing at and across boundaries, both 
in style and subject. Boundaries were certainly important for Forster insofar as he sought to 
break down, or at least reconcile, “seeming opposites: the seen and unseen, the prose and the 
passion, the beast and the monk, the joys of the flesh on one side and the inconceivable on the 
other, the transitory and the eternal”.28 One boundary Forster particularly sought to break 
down was that between the public sphere of state and business affairs, and the private sphere 
of personal relationships. 
 This attempt is evident in how Margaret Schlegel’s views develop in Howards End. 
At the start of the novel, Margaret’s sister Helen returns from an averted engagement to one 
of the Wilcox sons, Paul, “in a state of collapse”.29 Discussing the differences between the 
entrepreneurial Wilcoxes and the cultured Schlegels, Margaret and Helen end up privileging 
the private ‘inner’ life that so informs their identity. 30 
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‘I’ve often thought about it, Helen. It’s one of the most interesting things in the world. The truth 
is that there is a great outer life that you and I have never touched – a life in which telegrams and 
anger count. Personal relations, that we think supreme, are not supreme there. There love means 
marriage settlements, death, death duties. So far as I’m clear. But here my difficulty. This outer 
life, though obviously horrid, often seems the real one – there’s grit in it. It does breed character. 
Do personal relations lead to sloppiness in the end?’ 
‘Oh Meg, that’s what I felt, only not so clearly, when the Wilcoxes were so competent, and 
seemed to have their hands on all the ropes.’ 
‘Don’t you feel it now?’ 
‘I remember Paul at breakfast,’ said Helen quietly. ‘I shall never forget him. He had nothing to 
fall back upon. I know that personal relations are the real life, for ever and ever.’ 
‘Amen!’ 
 Despite Margaret and Helen privileging the inner, contemplative “real life” over the 
“obviously horrid” outer public life, even at this stage Margaret notes that the public life 
cannot be completely disregarded; after all, “there’s grit in it”, suggesting doubt as to which 
life is in fact the ‘real’ one. The necessity of the public sphere is more explicitly 
acknowledged when Margaret notes later that she is, 
‘tired of these rich people who pretend to be poor, and think it shows a nice mind to ignore the 
piles of money that keep their feet above the waves. I stand each year on six hundred pounds, and 
Helen upon the same, and Tibby will stand upon eight, and as fast as our pounds crumble away 
into the sea they are renewed’.31 
The “horrid” public sphere, Margaret realises, cannot be divorced from the contemplative 
private one because they are reliant on each other. 
 The central narrative in Howards End is the death of Mrs Wilcox (with whom 
Margaret had recently become friends) and Margaret’s subsequent improbable engagement to 
the widowed Wilcox patriarch, Henry. This partnering forces Margaret to further reconsider 
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her original stance and bring even closer together the public and private spheres she 
previously sought to separate. 
The business man who assumes that his life is everything, and the mystic who asserts that it is 
nothing, fail, on this side and on that, to hit the truth. ‘Yes, I see dear; it’s about half-way 
between,’ Aunt Juley had hazarded in earlier years. No; truth, being alive, was not half-way 
between anything. It was only to be found by continuous excursions into either realm.32 
Extending Margaret’s position into healthcare, we can note that the medical 
consultation is, on the one hand, an encounter occurring in the public sphere; an institutional 
encounter between patient and (often state-sponsored) clinician in which the latter is the 
gatekeeper of essential services the former may require. But on the other, a clinical encounter 
can be incredibly personal, involving matters of life, death, trust, shared history and intimacy. 
To be empathic in the clinic, therefore, the transactional encounter associated with the public 
sphere must be transformed into interpersonal connections and forms of communion 
associated with the private sphere. 
However, as Forster notes, such transformation is not a one-way street: “truth, being 
alive” requires “continuous excursion into either realm”. This is especially relevant in the 
clinic. The clinician also operates within the public sphere of the modern healthcare system; 
thus, it is not enough to merely reject the modern transactional encounter completely. To do 
so would be to not only reject the manifest advances of modern medicine, but also reject the 
necessary management of mundane and everyday institutional obstacles to good patient care. 
Obstacles that disproportionately impact certain marginalised groups. In achieving 
therapeutic empathy, therefore, the clinician is presented with the difficult task of not 
rejecting the transactional, but making it (partially) personal. Before conceiving in more 
detail how this difficult task might be achieved, we turn to the second barrier to connection 
foregrounded by Forster. 
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4. Connecting across socio-cultural and socio-economic divides 
 Margaret and Henry’s engagement is endangered by connections with the third family 
of note in Howards End, the Basts. Prior to the engagement, Helen and Margaret initially try 
to help the Basts – Leonard and Jackie, a working-class couple – in part through advice they 
elicit from Henry. However, this proves unhelpful, leaving the Basts destitute. Through a 
series of events, which reach back past the union of Margaret and Henry to an affair between 
Henry and Jackie, the encounters between all three families lead to tragedy. Through the 
development of this narrative, Margaret explicitly acknowledges the necessity of extending 
interpersonal connection into the public sphere, insofar as it “[enlarges] the space in which 
you may be strong”.33 Criticising Henry’s poor judge of character and his ability to cast 
friends off “cheerily into oblivion”, Margaret now “never forgot anyone for whom she had 
once cared; she connected, [even] though the connexion might be bitter”.34 
By the close of Howards End, “Henry’s fortress gave way” 35 and the connection 
Margaret strived for with the person she previously thought so “criminally muddled” 36 is, in 
part, achieved. However, as critics have noted, although Margaret and Henry have “learnt to 
understand one another and to forgive” 37, the same cannot be said for the connection 
between the Schlegels and Basts.38 Having pitied and romanticised Leonard, Helen spends a 
night with him, which results in a child. Although Forster partly resolves this development 
through Henry’s redemption and eventual acceptance and support of Helen, it is clear which 
family (and which class) gets the raw deal in the end. The central tragedy in the novel – the 
manslaughter of Leonard Bast by Charles, Henry’s other son – highlights the difficulties and 
costs of failing to connect. As with Forster’s other novels, Howards End reflects his central 
technique of “a revelation of the muddle experienced by people coerced by social convention 
and alienated from life and ’truth’ of the body”.39 Frank Kermode, in his 2007 Clark 
Lectures, suggests (citing Jonathan Rose) that Forster just fails with the character of Leonard 
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by underestimating the cultural advances of the British working class in the early twentieth 
century, thus producing an unfair caricature.40 Whether one accepts this thesis or not, we can 
certainly take from Forster the uncomfortable truth that connecting across socio-cultural and 
socio-economic divides is more difficult than we might like to admit, even in the clinic. 
 This difficulty is captured in Forster’s much quoted (and criticised 41) end to A 
Passage to India. Following distressing events since resolved, the English Fielding asks the 
Indian Aziz “Why can’t we be friends now?... It’s what I want. It’s what you want”. Forster, 
instead of narrative closure, gives a lyrical response emphasising the barriers to the 
possibility of their friendship.42 
But the horses didn’t want it – they swerved apart; the earth didn’t want it, sending up rocks 
through which riders must pass single-file; the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, 
the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view as they issued from the gap and saw Mau 
beneath: they didn’t want it, they said in their hundred voices, ‘No, not yet’ and the sky said, 
‘No, not there.’ 
 One interpretation of this ending suggests that Forster, by invoking natural or even 
metaphysical constraints, is advocating a kind of social conservatism. But this does seem at 
odds with Forster’s approach to life more generally. Through his roles as a public intellectual 
and broadcaster he explicitly sought to avoid a “calcification” of “rigid attitudes… first 
through natural inclination and then, later, by way of a willed enthusiasm, an openness to 
everything”.43 With respect to achieving therapeutic empathy, therefore, a more useful 
interpretation of the ending to A Passage to India might be that, as with the Schlegels, 
Fielding’s best intentions are not enough, providing a warning of the risks of voluntarism and 
overly liberal attitudes. Social change is required to facilitate or cultivate connections. While 
social barriers are entrenched in social structures, connection cannot be established solely by 
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an individual act of will (voluntarism); rather, such acts need facilitating and supporting by a 
shift in wider social structures (laws, attitudes and categories). 
Although A Passage to India more obviously foregrounds cultural differences and is 
Forster’s most famous novel, the critic Lionel Trilling suggests that Howards End is Forster’s 
masterpiece. This is partly because it most develops Forster’s central theme of connecting the 
prose and the passion into “a work of full responsibility” insofar as “it shows how almost 
hopelessly difficult it is to make this connection”.44 In Forster’s earlier novels – Where 
Angels Fear to Tread, The Longest Journey and A Room With a View – we realise that 
connection can be a positive, passionate, and creative act. But most explicitly in Howards 
End we appreciate how much this is tested; how much work is required to achieve it across 
socio-cultural and socio-economic divides. To even attempt connection, Forster suggests, we 
must acknowledge this difficulty and take “full responsibility” for it. Furthermore, such full 
responsibility cannot merely be conceived at the individual level, achieved through personal 
change alone. In making an Aristotelian point against liberal moral epistemology, Forster 
reminds us that we need to consider how social structures, cultural norms, and institutional 
constraints serve to affect interpersonal connections. Put in Aristotelian terms: if we are to 
provide a social environment in which individuals connect, we need to think about the 
structure of the Polis and the training in the virtues, such that the former supports the 
cultivation and exercise of the latter. If we do not, we risk making the same mistakes the 
Schlegels do with the Basts. 
5. A dispositional account of therapeutic empathy 
 In exploring Forster’s focus on connection, we highlight two factors that can 
influence how we conceive of and achieve connection and thus therapeutic empathy: first, the 
interrelation of the public and private spheres; and second, the influence social, cultural and 
economic factors have on our ability to make meaningful connections with one another. We 
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suggest that the medical consultation is, paradigmatically, a hybrid of both public and private 
spheres, insofar as clinicians must connect interpersonally with patients whilst exploiting the 
manifest advantages of modern medicine. This suggests that to achieve therapeutic empathy, 
clinicians require contextual modes of practice that combine the transactional rationality of 
modernity with interpersonally created values, or virtues. Furthermore, given connection is so 
contingent on socio-cultural and socio-economic factors in the first place, such modes of 
practice must be considered at both interpersonal and social levels. Developing this analysis, 
we propose a dispositional account of therapeutic empathy in which connection is conceived 
as neither an instinctive occurrence nor a process of representational inference, but a dynamic 
process of embodied, embedded and actively engaged inquiry.45 
5.1. Cultivating the dispositions to connect 
The idea that connection is not merely an instinctive occurrence is captured by 
another theme that pervades Forster’s work: the inadequate or undeveloped heart he initially 
gives many of his characters.46 As Zadie Smith notes, “we can hear in [Forster’s undeveloped 
heart] an antithetical echo of Aristotle’s ‘educated heart’” 47 which must be developed and 
cultivated if a character is to succeed. Smith explicitly foregrounds this Aristotelian 
interpretation of Forster, noting that “training and refinement of feeling plays an essential role 
in our moral understanding” and “it is Forster who shows us how hard it is to will oneself into 
a meaningful relationship with the world”.48 
We need not stick with Aristotle here. Training and refinement in dispositions can be 
explored via a number of philosophical schools, which share Aristotle’s monism and 
commitment to cultivating moral dispositions (virtues). One could, for example, develop an 
account building on the work of ecological psychologists who have developed James 
Gibson’s account and proposed a socialised account of affordances. Another, perhaps more 
fruitful, way to present this Aristotelian interpretation of connection (and thus empathy) is 
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through the language of a sophisticated modernist Aristotelian, the pragmatist philosopher 
John Dewey. For Dewey, as with Forster, although we cannot merely will ourselves towards 
making connections, we can consciously cultivate the dispositions to be able to make them in 
the first place. This suggests that therapeutic empathy can be partly trained and developed; 
clinicians can advance towards an “educated heart” even while accepting such advancement 
is an unending task. Dewey conceived of this process as one of developing and maintaining 
flexible habits, or dispositions to act. 
For Dewey, good habits are not eternal and we must, depending on the situation, be 
capable of replacing a failing habit with a more successful one. It is, therefore, our power to 
develop multiple, flexible habits that stands us in good stead, whereby the “increased power 
of forming habits means increased susceptibility, sensitiveness, [and] responsiveness”.49 Such 
dispositions to act are thus, for Dewey as Aristotle as Forster, not merely accidental 
developments but explicit cultivations. Furthermore, Dewey thought that to develop these 
flexible habits we need secondary ‘meta’ habits that allow us to actively reflect on (and if 
necessary adapt) our primary ones. 50 The Deweyan notion of actively reflecting on our 
primary habits characterises a Forsterian approach to connection, insofar as it is grounded, as 
Forster’s fiction is, explicitly in the idea that we can improve our approach to life through 
conscious development and training: many Forsterian protagonists – such as Margaret 
Schlegel, or Lucy Honeychurch in A Room With a View – develop towards making genuine 
connections by opening up to life, learning, and allowing their preconceptions to be 
challenged. 
An important feature of Dewey’s dispositional account is the centrality and continuity 
of practical judgements. For Dewey, inquiry of any kind – be it moral or non-moral – 
involves transforming an indeterminate situation into a determinate one. This is achieved by 
making judgements about “the practical adequacy of a course of action to perform a specific 
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function”.51 Therefore, a moral judgement is not a different kind of judgement. All 
judgements involve the exercise of practical reasoning (phronesis) in which an indeterminate 
situation is made (locally) determinate. And because situations only become problematic 
when they frustrate our habitual actions, we need to have developed multiple flexible habits 
which allow us to respond reflexively to such problematic situations. Such an account has 
particular consequences for achieving therapeutic empathy. Within such a framework – 
whereby both moral and non-moral judgements are continuous (insofar as they are both 
modes of practical reasoning) – the difficult clinical task of balancing the transactional 
rationality of modernity with interpersonally created values dissolves. Both aspects require 
the exercise of practical reasoning in resolving problematic situations. Both aspects can be 
supported by the development of multiple flexible habits (dispositions to act). 
5.2. Socio-culturally shaped dispositions 
As we have already noted, a central theme of Howards End is the influence social, 
cultural and economic factors have on our ability to connect. That influence often enables 
connection within boundaries but constrains attempts to connect across them. As Forster 
demonstrated, by ignoring these influences the Schlegels – even with the best liberal 
intentions – ultimately ruined the Basts. The importance of such factors is also reflected in 
Dewey, who conceived of habits as not merely ‘in the head’ but embedded in and informed 
by the interactional social environment. Dewey conceived of this most explicitly through his 
concept of the situation, defined as an “environing experienced world”52 which includes the 
coupled organism-environment “always found together in a dynamical transactional 
relation”.53 Within our Deweyan framework we support the development of therapeutic 
empathy through the cultivation of multiple flexible habits to connect with others. But, if we 
take Forster and Dewey seriously, we must also acknowledge that the cultivation of such 
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habits is inseparable from the social environments in which they are cultivated. Habits are not 
just dispositions to act, but socio-culturally cultivated, shaped and enabled ones. 
Personal habits of action cannot be separated from the environment in which they are 
situated because that environment is also cultural. Our environment both influences our 
habits and is in turn reconfigured by the effects of our changing habits of action themselves. 
Empathy is as much a social as an interpersonal concept. To achieve therapeutic empathy, 
therefore, it is not enough to merely focus on interpersonal actions in the clinical encounter. 
We must also attempt to change our structural environment and the social practices within it. 
6. Infer, simulate, or experience? 
 Grounded in an Aristotelian exegesis of Forster’s focus on connection, we developed 
a dispositional account in which therapeutic empathy is conceived as a process comprised of 
dynamically related interpersonal actions and social practices. Armed with this account, we 
now return to the conceptual debates on therapeutic empathy we previously outlined. 
Specifically, the debate on whether interpersonal understanding is achieved through 
inference, simulation, or experience. 
 In theory-theory or simulation-theory, content is brought to bear by the mind. On such 
cognitivist accounts, meaning is inferred or simulated rather than read-off, experienced, or 
seen in the world. However, in talking of empathy in terms of cultivating dispositions, we are 
talking about attuning people to be responsive to the humanity of those they encounter. 
Through our modernist Aristotelian interpretation this occurs in an already socialised 
environment, therefore this, 
reverses the notion that the experiencing of others occurs on the basis of an already fully 
developed individual mind, as assumed both by the formulation of a more or less naïve theory of 
other people’s minds, and by the attribution to other people of mental states similar to those 
experienced in first person via embodied simulation.54 
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In other words, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to give an account of how inferring or 
simulating interpersonal understanding is connected to or about the (life)world and others we 
encounter in it. The flexible habits so central to our Deweyan account are ecological, 
autopoietic structures embedded in the environment, not just in one’s head.55 The 
propositionally structured representations so central to theory-theory and simulation-theory 
seem ill-suited to account for this. We argue it is more accurate to suggest that therapeutic 
empathy is achieved through experience as per the phenomenological proposal. 
Our account in part accords with a recent article by Marshall and Hooker, who 
promote an affective account of empathy by extracting a process-oriented modal-Spinozism 
from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 56 Marshall and Hooker’s account 
broadly accords with our dispositional framework, insofar as a Deweyan account of multiple 
flexible habits echoes the Spinozist call to enhance our capacities to affect and be affected.57 
Our account can also be usefully compared with a recent philosophical view on defining 
therapeutic empathy, proposed on behalf of the Oxford Empathy Programme. In taking a 
broadly phenomenological view of therapeutic empathy, Bizzari et al. propose that “the 
clinician must strive to achieve two distinct, but interwoven, aims: … contemplate and feel 
other’s emotion… [and] transform it into an empathic attitude”. This, they suggest, means 
that although the act of empathy itself is intuitive, “therapeutic empathy as an attitude (phase 
two) can be taught”.58 We echo the importance of training and development in developing the 
ability to be empathic, but suggest the phasing of their definition is misleading, insofar as an 
“empathic attitude” (a disposition to be empathic) precedes not follows the empathic act 
(what Bizzari et al. term “empathic grasping” 59). 
 The history of debate in cognitive science and philosophy of mind suggests that non-
representational, enactivist, ecological or ethnomethodological accounts of interpersonal 
understanding, such as we are proposing, are increasingly influential but still peripheral. Our 
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account may not change that perspective. Nevertheless, even if one remains unmoved by our 
account of exactly how therapeutic empathy is achieved, we may still – in a therapeutic sense 
– defuse one of the central problems regarding therapeutic empathy. Namely, by providing an 
account of how empathy is not merely an untrainable reflex we argue it can be cultivated. 
This seems like a worthwhile practical consequence of our account, philosophical debate 
notwithstanding. 
7. Conclusion 
There is increasing evidence that therapeutic empathy improves clinical outcomes but 
there are significant challenges to achieving it. In this article we explore therapeutic empathy 
through interpretations of connection in the work of the novelist E.M. Forster. We propose 
that the challenges to achieving therapeutic empathy can be partly mitigated through Forster’s 
conception of connection as a socially embedded act, which we cash out in an ecological, 
dispositional account of empathy. This suggests that therapeutic empathy is not achieved 
through inference or simulation, but through a form of active experience. Philosophical 
debate notwithstanding, we argue that howsoever one conceives of therapeutic empathy, it is 
something that clinicians can cultivate through education and training. 
 
Patient and public involvement (PPI) statement 
There were no funds or time allocated for PPI so we were unable to involve patients. 
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